Re: Another Test on RSA Keys

Martin G. Diehl (mdiehl@nac.net)
Tue, 19 May 1998 08:18:33 -0400

• Next message: Bruce Schneier: "Re: Another Test on RSA Keys"
• Previous message: Adam Shostack: "Re: RSA's SecurPC not-so-"Secur""
• In reply to: Loren J. Rittle: "Re: RSA's SecurPC not-so-"Secur""

Bruce Schneier wrote:
>
> At 11:05 PM 5/18/98 +0200, Anonymous wrote:
> >Even inefficient algorithms like rho, p-1 and p+1 can be effective
> >against some fraction of keys if countermeasures are not taken.

[snip]

> My feeling is generally that strong primes are good, even though
> there is no reason to have them right now. There may be a reason
> in the future, and it can't hurt (we hope).

What if the attacker knew that your method always used strong
primes and conducted his search accordingly. Would that result
in a smaller keyspace for him to search/brute? Of course, unless
he had a very efficient way to generate strong primes, his test
for strong primes might lengthen search time.

> Bruce
> **********************************************************************
> Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098
> 101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis,MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590
> http://www.counterpane.com

-- 
Martin G. Diehl
I am what I am.  All opinions expressed within are strictly my own.

• Next message: Bruce Schneier: "Re: Another Test on RSA Keys"
• Previous message: Adam Shostack: "Re: RSA's SecurPC not-so-"Secur""
• In reply to: Loren J. Rittle: "Re: RSA's SecurPC not-so-"Secur""