Re: Another Test on RSA Keys

Bruce Schneier (schneier@counterpane.com)
Tue, 19 May 1998 08:40:15 -0500

• Next message: Bill Stewart: "Re: RSA's SecurPC not-so-"Secur""
• Previous message: Martin G. Diehl: "Re: Another Test on RSA Keys"
• In reply to: Bruce Schneier: "Re: Another Test on RSA Keys"

>What if the attacker knew that your method always used strong
>primes and conducted his search accordingly. Would that result
>in a smaller keyspace for him to search/brute? Of course, unless
>he had a very efficient way to generate strong primes, his test
>for strong primes might lengthen search time.

The different is negligible. There are so many primes N-bit primes
out there (N=1024 or 2048 or some other such number) that it
really doesn't matter.

Bruce
**********************************************************************
Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098
101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis,MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590
                                            http://www.counterpane.com

• Next message: Bill Stewart: "Re: RSA's SecurPC not-so-"Secur""
• Previous message: Martin G. Diehl: "Re: Another Test on RSA Keys"
• In reply to: Bruce Schneier: "Re: Another Test on RSA Keys"