Matt Blaze (mab@crypto.com)
Thu, 01 Oct 1998 20:28:53 -0400
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Perry E. Metzger [mailto:perry@piermont.com]
> >
> > Encryption technology has many uses. Although you may be unfamiliar
> > with the use of encryption for authentication, the developers of
> > technologies like IPSec and SSH do not seem to have been ignorant
> > of these techniques. MACs and digital signatures are hardly shocking
> > and unknown technologies.
>
> > The token isn't bonded to the person's skin. It is just as easily
> > stolen as anything else -- like their laptop with their (encrypted)
> > private key, say.
> [...]
> >
> > Okay. So, we've changed the problem from stealing the laptop to
> > stealing the token in the guy's wallet. Could you explain why this is
> > better in some way?
> >
> >
> Yes. The two fact works if the guy doesn't have a laptop. If he is using
> some other system to make access (yes, I know, it could have a trojan in
> it). Or, if he is using a shared system. In other words, one could consider
> the securID token sort of like a portable key - it can significantly reduce
> key/certificate management problems and increase security.
>
> I might be at a friend's home and need secure access to a critical system.
> How do I do that in a secure manner - for example, one that doesn't allow
> him to simply grab my password and use it later?
> What methodology verifies by both physical and secret-knowledge encryption?
> How would you achieve this?
>
> With a time-varying token, I know how to do this (understanding the
> weaknesses of the system that have been posted here already).
>
> John>
>
There is no reason that you can't use an external token in conjunction with
a cryptographically-protected session. See, for example,
ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/sesscrypt.ps
Token-based secuity makes little sense if the authentication provided by
the token isn't tightly bound to the session.
-matt
The following archive was created by hippie-mail 7.98617-22 on Sat Apr 10 1999 - 01:15:19