Markus Kuhn (Markus.Kuhn@cl.cam.ac.uk)
Sat, 22 Aug 1998 17:20:49 +0100
David Honig wrote on 1998-08-21 23:06 UTC:
> There is some neat work on deniable, steganographic file systems, but
> I haven't got the ref handy.
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/sfs3.ps.gz
This is the Anderson/Needham/Shamir StegoFS paper presented at
InfoHiding'98 in Portland. Basically a neat idea, although I feel that a
lot of work on engineering details is still necessary before this
becomes even close to something practically usable. And even then it
still does not resolve the problem that the presence of the StegoFS
driver on the system must be justified. Customs officers always have the
option of filtering your StegoFS such that all undisclosed content is
guaranteed to be erased. It doesn't make you any less suspicious if you
have highly sophisticated information theoretical algorithms installed,
whose really only purpose is to have plausible file-existence
deniability. Detecting the presence of a stego or encryption driver in
your OS is as easy/difficult as known-virus scanning.
Markus
-- Markus G. Kuhn, Security Group, Computer Lab, Cambridge University, UK email: mkuhn at acm.org, home page: <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/>
The following archive was created by hippie-mail 7.98617-22 on Sat Apr 10 1999 - 01:11:00